

Lesson Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Lesson ID: 80274-12804

Title: INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATION

Operation/Exercise Name: PROVIDE COMFORT

Observed: 28 Jul 1991

Originator: S-2

POC: MAJ RAFTERY

Commercial:

DSN:

5. (U) OBSERVATION:

Use of entire intelligence sections in a Joint Task Force (JTF) enhances intelligence operations.

6. (U) DISCUSSION:

Tactical intelligence operations below the JTF level were very successful and able to identify Iraqi units down to the individual fighting position. Information flow from higher headquarters was virtually non-existent and collection management was disjointed. All tactical intelligence collection assets were used to their fullest extent and every opportunity to gather intelligence on the Iraqis and Kurds was quickly exploited. An aggressive ground and air reconnaissance plan maintained constant surveillance on Iraqi positions and provided timely and accurate information on the location and dispositions of all Iraqi units operating within the 24 MEU Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Outstanding information was provided by USN Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) aircraft, which provided the only tactically useful information outside the 24 MEU TAOR. Interrogator translator team support was superlative and crucial to success of the operation. Human intelligence operations and collection provided enormous amounts of information concerning Pesh Merge activity and Iraqi secret police activity. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection was outstanding and well integrated with coalition Early Warning (EW) forces, despite the austere SIGINT collection environment. No information was received from higher HQ on developments within Iraq that could have affected 24 MEU operations until D+35. The focus was on reporting up the chain and not down. If Iraqi forces had attacked during the early days from Mosul to either Dihuk or Zakhu, we would not have known about it until the Iraqi forces entered the 24 MEU TAOR. As the security zone expanded, there was a breakdown in planning and coordinating collection operations between coalition forces. Due to the lack of guidance from higher headquarters and in an effort to

deconflict air and ground recon missions as well as signit missions, Major Subordinate Commands (MSC's) coordinated directly with each other. Likewise, the lack of information from higher HQ forced MSC's to contact known sources outside the chain of command to obtain current intelligence summaries of activity in Iraq. A JTF must have a robust collection and analysis section, capable of directing and coordinating the intelligence collection effort of MSC's, taking full advantage of organic capabilities. Tactical information must be analyzed, tailored and fused with available theater and national information to provide the clearest picture to the tactical consumer.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED:

Do not piecemeal the intel section into an operation like JTF did. The intelligence section must be an integral unit from an operational command.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION:

For any contingency operation, carefully review subordinate unit collection capabilities, organize the analytical section to fulfill tactical requirements and provide a daily collection priority message to all MSC's, as well as a daily product containing all-source information that is tactically useful.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

None.
